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AUTHOR'S NOTE 
A LMOST IMMEDIATELY upon completion of the writing of this lecture, WaI-
n ter Lippmann provided me with analytical support in an article entitled 
"A Critique of Congress" (Newsweek, January 20, 1964). As a long-time 
admirer of Mr. Lippmann, I was glad to have it, but I wish he had per-
mitted me to state the case first since my effort antedated his. Nevertheless 
I strongly encourage the politically interested to read the Lippmann col-
umn, for it is a perceptive bit of political writing, and it states more clearly 
and succinctly than I have done in the pages which follow one of the essen-
tial points that I have tried to make. The "principle" of legislative suprem-
acy, Lippmann says, is abused when it is employed by the Congress in the 
cause of "smothering and strangling" measures deemed to be of national 
interest by the President and presented to the national legislature for its con-
sideration. Ours is, he adds, a difficult system to operate, and its success de-
pends upon the application of "a very large supply of common sense." In 
short, Mr. Lippmann warns us against a reverence for so-called principles 
and forms that obscure the ends they were designed to achieve. 
In fact there is nothing substantially new in what either Mr. Lippmann 
or I propose. The failure to heed the warning, however, has always brought 
grief to the human race. It seems appropriate, then, to state it anew. The 
worst mistake men can make, in my opinion, is to assume that they have now 
arrived at that stage of perfection of institutional development which pre-
cludes the necessity of further alteration and adjustment. Yet no mistake 
is so persistently made, and each generation is compelled to learn again the 
sad truth that public problems can never be permanently solved, and that 
what have been almost universally regarded as fundamental and immutable 
principles become woefully inadequate in the course of time. They often be-
come, indeed, a camouflage for those who employ them for selfish purposes. 
One of my minor heroes, the Marquis of Halifax, stated almost three 
hundred years ago that what men call "fundamentals" are "a nail every-
body would use to fix that which is good for them; for all men would have 
that principle to be immovable that serves their use at the time .... Funda-
mental is a word used by the laity, as the word sacred is by the clergy, to fix 
everything to themselves they have a mind to keep, that nobody else may 
touch it." 
I wish I had said that. 
- M. JUDD HARMON 
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THE SEARCH FOR ' CONSENSUS 
PROFESSIONAL political scientists develop a particular way of looking at the world and interpreting its events. Because of the forces which act 
upon us all, the view may be excessively narrow, its importance may be ex-
aggerated, and it may be inaccurate as an interpretive device. Yet it is a key 
to understanding for the person who employs it. He inclines to view all pub-
lic problems in its light and tends to assume that the solution of social prob-
lems is contingent upon an adequate understanding and appreciation of it. 
My own view, and I make no claim to originality in expressing it, is 
that the political process in a democratic community involves essentially the 
search for a consensus. This necessitates the development of methods of 
arriving at conclusions on public policies which are in the public interest 
and are acceptable to majorities. In authoritarian communities where the 
principle of consent is of no substantial importance, this is not a major prob-
lem. In these polities, decisions are made and imposed by leaders who may 
or may not take the public interest into account but who, at any rate, are not 
required to consult the public before making decisions. In democratic com-
munities the matter is more complex. Since democratic government requires 
the consent of the governed, it must be discovered what that consent in-
volves and whether or not it is really given. Consensus means a general 
agreement. Not everyone need consent to a particular proposition but a 
majority must, and the position of a dissenting minority must be noted and 
respected. Finally, that minority ought not to be outraged; at least to the 
extent that it is, consensus is minimized. 
The difficulty of developing a consensus in a free community is that 
the particular interests of individuals and associated groups of individuals 
often stand in the way. As my more attentive students, past and present, 
will affirm, I have long argued that the conflict between particular interests 
and the general interest is, and has always been, the chief political problem 
confronting mankind. Past failure to resolve the conflict has resulted in 
domestic and international strife. Future failure may have far more dire 
consequences. I am not optimistic about the prospects. The problem is both 
ubiquitous and persistent; the solutions proffered are plethoric. I have re-
cently completed the writing of a history of political thought covering the 
period from the Greek city-states of antiquity to the totalitarian regimes of 
the mid-twentieth century. In the course of this project I have reread the 
writings of the great political thinkers of history and noted, ' as I have in the 
past, that each of them was vitally concerned with the social ill that I have 
described. The study of political thought is indeed concerned largely with 
) this matter. Some of the solutions prescribed are stimulating but unrealistic; 
some are revolting to decent and freedom-loving people; some are worthy 
of greater attention than has been given them. 
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It is discouraging to a student of the political process that man appears 
to be no closer to a solution of the problem of interest conflict now than he 
was more than two thousand years ago. But although it is discouraging it is 
understandable. Its cause is deeply rooted in human nature; at least I am 
convinced that it is. The problem in simple terms stems from the fact that 
as individuals each of us has desires which set us in conflict with our fellows. 
The motivation for self-gratification may not be as powerful as Thomas 
Hobbes, among others, thought it was, but it is there and must be reckoned 
with. In some instances the pursuit of selfish goals may have no effect upon 
our fellows. We can, for example, breathe all the air we want without con-
cerning ourselves with the welfare of our neighbors. But the list of meaning-
ful actions which an individual can take without impinging in some manner 
upon others is indeed short. 
It is also possible that the individual pursuit of self-interest may be of 
benefit to society. Adam Smith formulated his enormously influential eco-
nomic doctrine on precisely this assumption. If each person is left free, he 
stated, to pursue his own economic interest the unseen hand of competition 
will mysteriously but inevitably work in the general interest and produce a 
kind of utopian society. Whatever benefits may have flowed from the func-
tioning of an economic system based upon this premise, and there have un-
doubtedly been many, it also gave rise to a predatory economic system which 
brought misery to millions. It did not, in short, result in that service to the 
public interest which Smith, relying upon logic rather than empiricism, had 
thought would be inevitable. It seems fair to conclude that in the search for 
consensus laissez-faire, economic or otherwise, is of limited value. The fact 
is that much of what we might do, if we were unrestrained, would be harm-
ful to others. We may resent the restraint if we are doing the harm; we de-
mand it when we are being harmed. 
There is another view which is pertinent. It has been argued that there 
is in fact no conflict between a real personal interest and the general interest. 
When the individual acts in a manner that is injurious to his fellows he is 
really harming himself; he is serving his apparent rather than his genuine 
interest. This point was made by Jean Jacques Rousseau, who attempted to 
synthesize the particular and the general interest in his theory of the Gen-
eral Will. Rousseau's principal contribution, however, lies in his perception 
of the problem rather than in any practicable solution of it. The General 
Will was little more than the absolute rule of the majority and is repellent 
to one concerned with the protection of minorities. Rousseau himself con-
cluded that the General Will could function only in the city-state form of 
political organization. 
If the knowledge of man's failure to provide a satisfactory solution to 
this problem is depressing, it is positively frightening to note that as time 
goes on the problem becomes more difficult to solve. There are a number of 
reasons for this. A rapidly increasing population multiplies the number of 
personal interests. An industrial society promotes divergency of interest. 
Modem methods of communication and transportation increase our inter-
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dependency. If the accommodation of interests was so difficult within the 
small and relatively simple society of, say, the Athenian city-state, how much 
more so is it in the populous and complex nation-state of the present! In the 
twentieth century the people of a number of nations, appalled by the con-
fusion attending a conflict of interests which appeared to them to border on 
anarchy and unable to develop a voluntary consensus, have surrendered 
their freedom and accepted the authority of an absolute government. Both 
Hitler and Mussolini promised to relieve their people of the terrible burden 
of making decisions in a troublesome and complicated world. The results 
of that abdication of personal responsibility demonstrate the futility and 
danger of any solution based upon the complete relinquishment of individ-
ual freedom. 
I do not wish to imply that a total solution is desirable, for it could 
create a worse situation than that which provoked it. We could assume, for 
example, that men are so evil and selfish that if they are granted any free-
dom to pursue individual goals they would inevitably damage the general 
interest; the only remedy in such a case would be an autocratic regime and 
a correlative suppression of personal liberty. This was the conclusion of 
Hobbes as it was, and is, of the totalitarians of the present century. A second 
possibility is anarchy. If men are naturally good and altruistic and have 
become corrupted only because of institutional restraints, then the obvious 
answer lies in the elimination of the institutions. This is what Marx pro-
posed should follow a period of preparation in the proletarian dictatorship; 
it is also very nearly what Adam Smith suggested, although the anarchist 
implications of Smith's theory are not so well understood. 
Some argue that the danger of such extremist views can be circum-
vented through an institutional arrangement which anticipates conflicts of 
interest and reconciles or restrains them. This is the direction in which Locke 
points and the position most clearly taken by Montesquieu. The philoso-
phies of both were influential with the framers of the Constitution of the 
United States. I intend to devote attention to this matter later. Suffice it to 
say at this point that whatever may have been, or is, the value of such in-
stitutional arrangements as separation of powers, checks and balances, fed-
eralism, and others, they have by no means solved the problem of interest 
conflict. Indeed they often prevent rather than facilitate solutions, and they 
demonstrate to me that to the degree that such institutional arrangements 
are inflexible they are worse than useless. They contribute to stalemate by 
requiring that problems be solved within a rigid and established institutional 
framework which too soon becomes anachronistic. The world of contin-
gency and change is much larger than the rigid institutionalists imagine. 
Here is the essence of the problem which I intend to discuss. 
There is an element of validity in each of the three proposals I have 
cited. All men require some restraint and some a great deal. They also want 
some freedom. And the institutionalists are correct in advocating structural 
arrangements capable of reconciling conflicts of interest; they are incorrect, 
however, in assuming that any such arrangement can solve all problems and 
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more so when they propose that institutions adequate to the needs of one 
time and place should be regarded as universal and immutable. We may 
safely acknowledge that the necessity for government is universal. We can-
not similarly universalize forms of government; neither can we assume their 
permanent validity. 
Certain assumptions, then, seem warranted. One is that it is impossible 
to organize society in such a manner as to preclude all conflict of interest. 
But it is also necessary to hold conflict within reasonable bounds. Failure to 
do so will result in the collapse of society. Human nature being what it is, 
however, complete homogeneity and absence of conflict can be achieved 
only at the cost of freedom. A corollary of this assumption is that even a 
proximate solution will be difficult to find and will be incapable of achiev-
ing universal approbation. It is natural, I presume, to wish to have all of our 
problems solved; this, however, is impossible even on a personal level. Its 
impossibility should be even more apparent when it comes to national and 
international problems. The attractiveness of radical movements of both 
left and right lies largely in that each promises to solve problems of great 
magnitude swiftly and simply. The leftists argue that abandonment of the 
private ownership of the means of production will result in utopia. The 
rightists say that the state of blessedness is contingent upon abolition of the 
income tax, the federal government, foreign aid. The perceptive student of 
politics knows that solutions are not so easily found. He may not be able to 
provide an answer, but he understands that any answer will be enormously 
complex and only partially satisfactory. 
A second assumption is that although government is necessary its form 
will vary with both time and circumstances. A governmental structure ade-
quate for Americans would probably be hopelessly inappropriate for Abys-
sinians. The point is difficult for many to comprehend, but far less difficult 
than it is to understand that a governmental structure which may have 
served Americans well in 1800 could only fail if it were pitted against the 
conditions of the mid-twentieth century. Those who contend that the na-
tional salvation is contingent upon a return to the supposed purity of the 
principles of the Founding Fathers are either abysmally ignorant of the 
realities of political life, or they are guilty of attempting to disguise their 
mm selfish goals with a cloak of spurious respectability. The validity of gov-
ernmental structures is relative. I see no sanctity in any of them; on the con-
trary I see great danger in attributing that quality to them. Thomas Jeffer-
son stated this idea with great force. 
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence and deem 
them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe 
to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose 
what they did to be beyond amendment .... I am certainly not an advocate 
for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think mod-
erate imperfections go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind . 
. . . As new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and 
opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must ad-
vance also and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man 
to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to 
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remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors .... Each gen-
eration ... has a right to choose for itself the form of government it be-
lieves the most promotive of its own happiness .... 
Jefferson was an ardent champion of states' rights; it is unlikely that he 
would be today. In his time the states' rights doctrine supported govern-
mental responsibility and democracy; today it is too often a cover for Nean-
derthal politicians who pursue a policy of race discrimination and outrage 
the rights of minorities within their states. This is only one of a great many 
examples which could be cited to illustrate the point that we too often lose 
the substance while retaining the form. It should also demonstrate that a 
government should be judged by what it does, not by the form it takes. 
It seems to me, in other words, that we have a tendency to confuse the 
ends we seek with the means which are developed to achieve them. If we 
grant that the proper goal is the attaining of a consensus and that this neces-
sarily requires the accommodation of the particular and the general interest 
(which is another way of saying that we seek the general welfare) , then we 
err if we fail to achieve it because of our reluctance or refusal to modify 
methods, regardless of how successful they might previously have been. I 
am not suggesting that the end always justifies the means. I have already 
stated that I reject the solutions of the extremists, and I further repudiate 
the notion that the general welfare can ever be achieved unless the substan-
tive liberties of the individual are preserved. I confine my discussion and 
recommendations to methods and institutional adjustments which, I believe, 
would not outrage the sensitivities of those who, rightly, are concerned with 
means as well as ends. 
As a people we ought to develop a new way of looking at political prob-
lems. We should view them more critically and with a greater fund of 
knowledge supporting the criticism. We must first recognize the distinction 
between means and ends and, second, we should abandon our attitude of 
reverence toward the means. We should devote less time to extolling the 
virtues of our institutions and praising their past successes and more to a 
critical appraisal of them in the light of present conditions. We need less 
oratory and more pragmatism. Such proposals, of course, always cause con-
servative hackles to rise, and throughout the land the warning goes forth 
against "revolution." But wise conservatives, as well as progressives, also 
know that it is the failure to adjust the means, to alter institutions as condi-
tions demand, that is most responsible for revolution. This is a lesson that 
history has repeatedly taught, and it is remarkable that it has not yet been 
learned by many. Remarkable but understandable. There develops in every 
society a vested interest in the status quo, one with social, political, and eco-
nomic manifestations. Those who benefit most from the status quo are most 
reluctant to consider suggestions for change. Even when they are precari-
ously poised on the precipice of revolution they tend resolutely to look the 
other way and to reject the reforms that might salvage at least part of their 
heritage. The pages of history are replete with accounts of this fatal weak-
ness. The collapse of the Bourbon, Stuart, and Romanoff dynasties provides 
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only three examples; there are many more. It is also a fact that the people 
are generally conservative. They prefer the established ways. They will en-
dure considerable inconvenience, even hardship, before sanctioning change. 
In our own country a greater alteration of institutions has occurred 
than is recognized by most. The political party system, without a shred of 
constitutional sanction, has developed and brought to government a meas-
ure of democracy and responsibility that would have received the most pro-
found disapproval of the framers of the Federal Constitution. The com-
merce and taxing clauses of the Constitution have been put to uses on behalf 
of the general welfare that would have evoked cries of anguish from the 
members of the Philadelphia Convention. And perhaps most important 
of all, the cumbersome and complex electoral college system now permits 
rather than precludes the democratic election of a President of the United 
States. 
These and other developments have maintained the viability of our 
system. Without them we would have had either to abandon it or see it 
become authoritarian. We have, therefore, at least implicitly acknowledged 
the necessity of institutional metamorphosis. We must extend the operation 
of the principle to other areas. This is an enormously difficult task, and I am 
not sanguine about the prospects of accomplishing it. Under the most favor-
able circumstances people are reluctant even to question the validity of in-
stitutional arrangements, let alone alter them substantially. The reluctance 
is compounded in a period of international tension such as we have been 
undergoing for the past quarter of a century or more. Yet it should be done, 
and the range of criticism and analysis should not stop short of some of the 
most fundamental aspects of our system. 
I can do no more here than suggest a few of the more important re-
forms that I regard as desirable. There are others, but in my own thinking 
these have come to occupy a central position. They are fundamental in the 
formulation of that context within which I tend to interpret the functioning 
of our governmental system. And if I am wrong in my concern I am not 
alone. Few political analysts have suggested an exhaustive analysis and 
basic alteration of some of the most hallowed of our governmental struc-
tures. Nevertheless, the almost total preoccupation of students of govern-
ment with problems arising from the malfunctioning of these structures in-
dicates to me that some such action is necessary. I shall consider here four 
of them: the separation of powers and checks and balances, federalism, 
legislative supremacy, and direct representation. 
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS 
AND BALANCES 
SEPARATION OF POWERS and checks and balances is the theory that the best way to avoid despotic government is to assign the three major func-
tions of government, legislative, executive, and judicial, to three separate 
agencies and to provide. each with powers to prevent the abuse of authority 
by the others. In its basic elements the concept is very old. In the seven-
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teenth century it was advocated by John Locke in the Second Treatise, and 
it received its fullest consideration and development in Montesquieu's The 
Spirit of the Laws in the middle of the eighteenth century. It is necessary 
to understand the circumstances in which Locke and Montesquieu wrote. 
Each was interested in attacking the abuses of power by absolute monarchs 
- Locke those of the Stuarts and Montesquieu those of the Bourbons. Since 
Montesquieu was, with respect to this doctrine, more influential among 
Americans than Locke I shall use him here as the main point of reference. 
In most respects, Montesquieu's separation of powers theory was reac-
tionary. It regarded absolute monarchy as an innovation, which it was, and 
looked back nostalgically to the class structure of commoners, nobles, and 
royalty that had prevailed in the medieval period. His animosity toward 
the Bourbon autocracy of his own time led Montesquieu to take a distorted 
view of the past. He believed that medieval times had been stable and 
peaceful and that this was because there had existed a well-defined class 
structure, each part of which had its established and protected prerogatives. 
He assumed that the turbulence of his own era had resulted from the de-
struction of that system. In fact medievalism had not been as utopian as 
Montesquieu thought. The particularism resulting from the will to power 
of the feudal aristocracy had led to a forced unity imposed by a king sup-
ported by the middle class, which believed that its own advantage would be 
secured by such action. 
Montesquieu's theory was appealing to Americans who, around the 
time of the Revolution, understandably tended to equate governmental 
power with tyranny and executive authority in particular with the policies 
of the sometimes mad George III. Upon declaring their independence, 
Americans proceeded in the establishment of their own governments to 
regard them with the same suspicion that had marked their view of their 
former British masters. A concept of government designed originally to 
maintain a balance of power among contesting classes was adopted unques-
tioningly by a people who, for the most part, rejected the notion of a society 
based upon a rigid class structure. The French statesman Turgot, watching 
these developments with great interest, commented sardonically but per-
ceptively: 
I see in the greatest number of the American State Constitutions an un-
reasonable imitation of the usages of England. Instead of bringing all the 
authorities into one, that of the nation, they have established different 
bodies - A House of Representatives, a council, a governor, - because 
England has a House of Commons, lords, and a King. They undertake to 
balance these different authorities, as if the same equilibrium of powers 
which has been thought necessary to balance the enormous preponderance 
of royalty could be of any use in republics, formed upon the equality of all 
citizens; and as if every article which constitutes different bodies was not 
a source of divisions. By striking to escape imaginary dangers, they have 
created real ones. 
Precisely. And this situation led to the development in the American 
mind of a kind of political schizophrenia. It has long seemed incredible to 
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me that the American people are often strident in their demands for govern-
mental action and at the same time suffer a guilt complex because of this 
supposedly immoral conduct. We need, perhaps, mass psychiatric treat-
ment capable of convincing us that democratic and responsible government 
can be strong without being despotic and can provide service without neces-
sarily contributing to the corruption of our morals. 
Americans take great pride in the principle of separation of powers and 
checks and balances, often attributing to it the successes our system has 
enjoyed over the years. What is not sufficiently understood is that, whatever 
the advantages that may flow from a system based upon the principle, to the 
degree that separation of powers and checks and balances "work," govern-
ment does not. The process of a bill being passed by Congress, vetoed by the 
President, repassed over the presidential veto by a two-thirds majority of 
rebellious legislators only to be nullified by the Supreme Court may be an 
exciting one, but it is certainly unproductive. It is full of sound and fury 
signifying stalemate. Such a system was tolerable during a period of our 
history when the necessity of efficient and operable government was not so 
great. The near paralysis that often results from its operation in the vastly 
different political climate of the mid-twentieth century makes it a much 
more pressing problem today. It appears to me that separation of powers 
and checks and balances dangerously encourage factionalism and bar the 
path to the consensus that is necessary for national survival. Moreover, in 
the light of the British experience it is obvious that the principle is not indis-
pensable to the operation of a democratic system. It is one of the strange 
quirks of history that at the very time we were copying and implementing 
what we conceived to be a system based on the English model of separation 
and checks, the British themselves were in the process of developing the par-
liamentary and cabinet system which negates it. And whatever criticism one 
might level against the British system of government, only the unenlightened 
could charge that despotism was the result of that repudiation. I suggest 
that the idea of the general interest being better served by a policy of gov-
ernment cooperation than by one of warring branches is neither unwise nor 
immoral. It is, rather, only common sense. 
FEDERALISM 
MANY OF THE criticisms of separation of powers may also be leveled against federalism. Montesquieu advocated a federal system because 
he believed that a consensus was impossible in anything other than a small 
polity. Again, Montesquieu was influenced by his reverence for medieval 
institutions. He could not see that the particularism of the feudal system 
had resulted in its demise and the consequent rise of monarchical power. 
There was already the necessity for a national consensus, but this was not 
apparent to Montesquieu, whose major concern was a restoration of the 
prerogatives of the aristocracy. Montesquieu conceded that the demands of 
security required a greater degree of cohesion where matters of military and 
foreign policy were concerned; thus he proposed a confederative system in 
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which domestic policy would be in the hands of the component units of the 
confederation whereas military and diplomatic matters would be directed 
by a central government. 
It was this assumption that a national consensus is necessary in for-
eign and military affairs but not in domestic affairs that so greatly influ-
enced Americans in the post-Revolutionary period. The assumption was 
unfounded when Montesquieu made it, still more wrong when Americans 
incorporated the principle into their own system, and I believe it is almost 
wholly anachronistic today. That Americans had carried the confederate 
principle too far in the Articles of Confederation, which rather faithfully 
followed Montesquieu's idea, was argued by the Federalists - Hamilton, 
Adams, Marshall, and others. They were successful in obtaining the ratifica-
tion of the present Constitution, which departs considerably from the con-
federative principles of the Articles. Hamilton would have gone further. 
He urged the elimination of the states altogether and the creation of a single 
nation. Many of his compatriots agreed in principle but recognized that the 
public, already suspicious of events in Philadelphia, would reject such a 
proposal out of hand. The Founding Fathers settled for a new constitution 
which vested an imposing array of powers in the national government but 
left undetermined the central issue of whether the United States comprised 
a single nation or a coalition of independent states, each of which volun-
tarily lent a portion of its sovereign powers to the national government to be 
exercised at the pleasure of the states. 
This was an issue that arose almost as soon as the Constitution was 
placed in operation; it became more critical as the years passed. Were we 
a nation, or weren't we? Was there a national interest or were there merely 
the particular interests of the states? Under the circumstances was it legiti-
mate to think in terms of a national consensus, or was this contrary to the 
constitutional intent of the Founding Fathers? The United States became 
a nation when a majority of Americans possessing a superior force of arms 
became convinced that there was a national interest on an issue of overrid-
ing importance and that it should prevail over the particular interests of the 
Southern States. A bloody civil war was required to establish the point, and 
there is considerable evidence that it has not yet been learned by many, but 
this is nonetheless what that unfortunate and "irrepressible" conflict was 
about. The American Civil War is a striking illustration of the fact that insti-
tutions must conform to changing conditions or die. My own feeling is that 
in the bitter debate that preceded the conflict, the spokesmen for the South 
had the better of the constitutional argument. This counted for nothing in 
the end because they were making the classical error of attempting to main-
tain the status quo. Such efforts, irrespective of how admirable they may be, 
must inevitably be cast upon the ash heap of history. 
Whatever one's personal feelings on the matter may be, the fact is that 
we must be a nation or we shall perish. The major domestic problems of our 
society are manifestly national problems. The growing imbalance of state 
and national power, in favor of the latter, is almost wholly attributable to 
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the fact that states have been unable or unwilling to meet the needs of their 
people. If the national government has itself often been found wanting in 
this regard, if it has been less efficient than it might have been, the fault lies 
in large part in the federal principle. A member of Congress who is com-
pelled to pursue the national interest with one foot always in his own con-
stituency will be generally found running in circles. I intend shortly to 
explore this issue in more detail. Suffice it to say here that in my opinion the 
national government does the job of governing better than do the states. 
To a great many people who still think in terms of the Jeffersonian 
tradition of local government, the inexorable enlargement of national power 
is frightening. We have been nurtured by a tradition which holds that 
despotism expands in proportion to the increase of geographic distance 
between the citizen and those who govern him. Thus local government is 
ideally honest, responsible, responsive, efficient, and incorruptible. The na-
tional government, centered in faraway Washington, is dishonest, irrespon-
sible, unresponsive, inefficient, and corrupt. This belief is without founda-
tion in fact as most informed students of government agree. I am not sug-
gesting that all federal officials are paragons of virtue and efficiency or that 
the national government is a model of competence. But compared with the 
governments of most of the states and especially the sub-units of the states, 
the national government is greatly superior. In our daily lives most of us 
acknowledge this without thinking much about the matter. Bitter experi-
ence has taught us that if national resources are to be conserved the national 
government, not the states, must conserve them. If we wish the apprehen-
sion of a dangerous criminal we hope that there is a federal issue involved 
so that the Federal Bureau of Investigation or some other federal agency 
may have jurisdiction, because we have greater respect for their abilities 
than we do for those of the local constabulary. A great variety of examples 
could be offered to substantiate the view. 
Jefferson's contention that local governments were more responsive to 
the will of the people was based upon the fact that with the primitive meth-
ods of transportation and communication which existed at the time, the 
people could not be as knowledgeable of the operations of their national 
government as they were of the governments of their communities. Today, 
however, the affairs of Washington and the world are no further than an 
electric switch or the newspaper on the front porch. Moreover those affairs 
are highly publicized. Great and powerful news organizations vie with one 
another to root out information for the public. Today the vast majority of 
citizens are more interested in and have a more detailed knowledge of the 
functioning of their national government than they do of their local govern-
ments. Given this greater interest and knowledge, given the fact that the 
national government provides a large variety of services and imposes many 
regulations, and recognizing that those who make national policy are elected 
just as are the officials of local govenlment, it follows that the responsive-
ness of the national government to the demands of constituents is more sub-
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stantial than that of local officials. Indeed, in my opinion, the responsive-
ness may well be excessive, and I shall comment on this subsequently. 
All this serves to illustrate another manifestation of that national schiz-
ophrenia to which I earlier referred. In fact we demand national service 
and generally recognize it as superior in quality to that provided by state and 
local governments. Yet because this is contrary to a tradition with which we 
have long lived we tend to regard ourselves as culpable because of our ac-
tions. We applaud the impassioned oratory of states righters and term it 
"American"; at the same time our interest is focused upon the national gov-
ernment, and our real hope for a solution to the important public problems 
lies there. This is further evidence of our confusion over ends and means. 
The increasing complexity and ramification of political issues has national-
ized them and considerably outdated federalism. Why should this so deeply 
concern us? The goal of government is still the same - to provide a com-
munity in which the good life, moral and material, may be lived. If this is 
better accomplished by the national than by state governments, why should 
we not employ it. If there is Scriptural support for federalism I have not 
found it. I do not argue that state and local governments and services be 
abandoned wholesale. I do suggest that we approach the problem of the 
assignment of responsibilities logically rather than emotionally. Of course 
we have over the years steadily been altering our federal system. But we 
have done so grudgingly and have experienced inconvenience and some-
times flirted with disaster because our predilection to sanctify the means 
produces indecision. And the guilt we feel when we alter our path often 
makes us susceptible to the exhortations of the dim witted who chastise us 
for departing from the "traditions of the Fathers." I have admiration and 
respect for the teachings of the past. A study of history, and particularly the 
history of political thought, leads me to conclude, however, that the greatest 
lesson history has to offer is that man cannot live in the past, cannot use the 
institutions appropriate to one generation for a later generation, and that 
attempts to do so have been consistently fatal to the polities of yesterday. 
LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY 
T HE MIDDLE CLASS in England and Europe in the seventeenth and eight-eenth centuries became disillusioned with the absolute monarchs whom 
they had helped to power. There ensued a series of revolutions the chief 
purpose of which was to substitute the authority of representative legislative 
bodies for that of the king. Locke in his Second Treatise, which subsequently 
provided a handbook for our own revolutionary forebears, stated that the 
"legislative" should be "the supreme power in every commonwealth" and 
that the best kind of government was that in which "the Legislative power 
is put into the hands of divers Persons who, duly Assembled, have by them-
,selves, or jointly with others, a Power to make Laws." The reason for the 
abandonment of the monarch by the middle class in favor of a body of its 
own representatives is easily discoverable. The king had been supported 
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earlier because it appeared that only he was capable of suppressing a dis-
orderly nobility, which had for centuries obstructed the channels of com-
merce and cut deeply into the earnings of the bourgeoisie. But monarchs 
ultimately forgot their debt to the middle class. The expense of consolidat-
ing their own powers and of satisfying extraterritorial ambitions was great, 
and the thirst for revenues could only be slaked at the fountain of bour-
geois profits. The resentful middle class proceeded to remove the heads of 
the more intransigent monarchs and strip the rest of most of their powers. 
The ultimate result was the rise of republics and constitutional monarchies 
in which representative legislative bodies exercised the bulk of political 
power. Once again we see the operation of that irrevocable historical rule 
that institutions must alter or perish. Or to state the case differently, when 
the established means are no longer capable of achieving the desired ends 
their replacement is imperative. 
At the time of the framing of our own state and national constitutions 
the principle of legislative supremacy was almost unanimously approved. 
Americans restricted both the terms and the prerogatives of their own ex-
ecutives, making them essentially figureheads and subservient to the legis-
latures in whom the bulk of power was lodged. It soon became apparent 
that they had gone too far. Shortly after the beginning of the nineteenth 
century constitutional conventions were held in a number of states to repair 
the damage resulting from a serious imbalance of legislative-executive au-
thority. That the people's earlier views had been colored by their colonial 
experience could now be more clearly seen. As a delegate to the New York 
constitutional convention of 1821 put it: 
An erroneous idea seems to have prevailed in relation to the powers and 
origin of the governor. Who is he? and by whom is he appointed? Does 
he derive his authority from the king of Great Britain? Is he an usurper? 
If so, let us unite to depose him. But, sir, he is the man of the people-
elected by their suffrages and identified with their interests. He is a watch-
ful sentinel to guard us from evil and a zealous friend to admonish us of 
error. 
The issue could hardly be stated more clearly. There is a difference, exten-
sively sensed and felt but not often enough thought out and coherently 
understood and expressed, between an hereditary and divine right monarch 
on the one hand and an executive elected by a majority in a system of uni-
versal suffrage on the other. The first is irresponsible, the second is responsi-
ble. The first is removable only by force (or by pressure which threatens 
force) , the second must bow to the will of the electorate expressed through 
the voting process. 
The organization of national political parties in Jefferson's time and 
the broadening of the suffrage in the Jacksonian era brought the first of the 
popular chief executives who have ever since captivated the interest and 
often the hearts of the American people. Ours became a presidential rather 
than a congressional system of government. The eyes of the nation are on 
the White House far more than on Capitol Hill. Interest in presidential 
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elections greatly surpasses that in congressional or state elections. In the 
majority of the struggles between President and Congress, the executive has 
won, and he could not have done so without popular support. A President 
may be loved or hated; he is always the focal point of national interest and 
the object of the nation's concern. 
These developments are attributable to a number of causes, but the 
main one is that the President of the United States is the only official (I ex-
cept the Vice President whose authority and prestige are only potential) 
who is, by virtue of the manner in which he is elected, the representative of 
the general interest. By the same token Congress is representative of the 
particular interests. It could well be fatal for a Congressman to support the 
national interest rather than the interest of his state or district on an issue 
where the two are in conflict. But a President cannot afford to be the cap-
tive of a particular interest. At any rate if he is and the fact is discovered 
his influence and power are seriously jeopardized. There have been such 
Presidents in the past; history has relegated them to an inferior status as 
compared with those who have struggled for the national interest against 
the omnipresent and potent special interests. 
Legislative supremacy was advocated as a solution to a problem aris-
ing out of certain conditions. The question today is whether different con-
ditions justify a continued adherence to the principle. In short, is the legis-
lative ordinarily more representative of the general interest than is the ex-
ecutive? My own feeling is that it is not. Nor does it possess the expert 
knowledge necessary to frame the intricate and detailed legislation that is 
called for in modern times. The great majority of important bills introduced 
in Congress today originate with the executive. Congress, as students of 
government well understand, has become a debating and ratifying body 
rather than a legislative body in the traditional sense of the word. Unfor-
tunately Congress is also often an obstructive body. It has evolved an elabo-
rate system of organization, rules, procedures, and customs which places 
disproportionate power in the hands of a few who often use it to frustrate 
the majority will. It is a situation which cannot be explored here, but a 
cursory reading of a daily newspaper suffices to illustrate it. Some of the 
more responsible members of Congress have lectured their colleagues on the 
errors of their ways but without visible effect. Legislative bodies should 
heed the lessons of history, or they are likely to find themselves in the un-
happy position of the monarchs whose authority they appropriated. Even 
the most apathetic public is eventually bound to be impressed by the barrage 
of criticism that has been leveled against Congress by its critics. 
The national consensus today is far more likely to be reflected in poli-
cies and actions of the President than in those of Congress. This indicates 
the desirability of an altered role for our legislative body. It should always 
have the power to say "no" to the President, but the basis upon which it does 
so should be changed considerably. If this is to be done, Congress must be 
reformed. Under our system it can only reform itself. I cannot detail the 
desired reforms here, but they are well known. Fundamentally reform must 
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be directed toward making Congress more capable of reflecting a national 
consensus, a general interest. Changes in procedures to facilitate majority 
rule and the curbing of obstructionist tactics are necessary. The Supreme 
Court's 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr~ upholding the jurisdiction of federal 
courts over law-suits challenging malapportionment of the legislative dis-
tricts of a state is bound to have far-reaching and beneficial consequences in 
the struggle to increase the representative quality of the House of Repre-
sentatives. Other views of this problem will be discussed in the following 
section. 
In this, as in other aspects of the problem that we have been consider-
ing, it is apparent that practice has outrun the theoretical functioning of 
our institutions. Framers of our Constitution thought that the President 
would be an arbiter between the House of Representatives and the Senate 
and that he would act as an executive agent of the Congress. The President 
has, of course, become far more powerful than this. He is today the chief 
legislator as well as the chief executive, and his authority has far exceeded 
that for which even the most ardent supporters of executive power in the 
Philadelphia Convention hoped. This would not have occurred had not 
changing circumstances demanded it and had not the public endorsed it. 
The change of means was necessary to the achievement of the same end. 
Again, we sense this - indeed we demand it. But we still experience that 
feeling of guilt in doing so. We still tend to equate executive power with 
despotism and a President of the United States with a divine right monarch. 
This often leads us to place unnecessary barriers in our own path. For in-
stance we elect a President who pledges support to a program designed to 
accomplish the general interest, and we then commend as "independent," 
and thus admirable, those legislators, even in his own party, who obstruct 
him in his pursuit of that goal. We admire and demand strong presidents, 
but there are many who level the charge of dictatorship when one appears. 
We attack a President for infringing upon the prerogatives of Congress, as 
if the prerogatives of Congress should be anything less than the serving of 
the general interest. And whoever heard of a dictator submitting to the will 
of the electorate every four years? There ought to be, within Congress and 
without, a more intelligent recognition of the appropriate scope of Con-
gressional action in the present era. It is still a highly important one involv-
ing debate, the airing of public issues, criticism, passage of legislation, in-
vestigation, watchdog duties, and more. But it is not what it used to be, and 
the principle of legislative supremacy can no longer be regarded as it was 
formerly. New institutional arrangements must mirror the conditions of the 
changing society. 
DIRECT REPRESENTATION 
T HE CHIEF OBSTACLES to the development of consensus in the Congress are the methods by which the members are nominated and elected. In 
part, this impediment was imposed by the framers of our Constitution who 
provided that a member of Congress must be an "inhabitant" of the state 
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he represents. Direct representation was a part of the English political tradi-
tion that Americans inherited along with their language. It was, however, 
reinforced by the conditions that prevailed at the time we won our inde-
pendence and established our own governments. As we have seen previ-
ously, this was a period of intense state loyalty. Men generally considered 
themselves as citizens of their respective states first and citizens of the United 
States second, if at all. No one thought that his own interest and that of his 
fellow citizens within a state could be fairly and adequately represented by 
a resident of another state. Again, we were not yet a nation and the concept 
of a common interest outside of military and diplomatic necessity was un-
developed. 
But a nation was established and a common interest requiring a na-
tional consensus for its achievement was recognized more generally. The 
problem was, and is, the formulation of such a consensus in the face of the 
existence of a system of nomination and election which reflects the particu-
lar more than it does the general interest. Our salvation, thus far, has been 
the office of the President precisely because the method by which the Presi-
dent is elected requires him to represent the generality. The President has 
also developed "carrot and stick techniques" to assist him in obtaining sup-
port from a recalcitrant Congress. The particularism of Congress does not 
reflect upon the character of its members, the overwhelming majority of 
whom are honorable men. But Congressmen, responsible for their nomina-
tion and election to their own constituencies, understand that if they are 
to win and maintain their positions they must satisfy those constituencies. 
What constituencies want and what the national interest demands are all 
too often different things. Irrespective of a southern senator's personal feel-
ings on the matter he may be advised to oppose a civil rights bill. The rep-
resentative of a constituency containing a preponderance of members of 
organized labor would perhaps be unwise to support compulsory arbitration 
even if he were convinced that the nation as a whole would be better off 
if he did. The legislator representing an agricultural state, regardless of his 
views with respect to the national interest, feels a strong compulsion to vote 
on farm legislation the way his constituents demand. 
It has been argued that out of the welter of conflicting particular in-
terests the general interest somehow emerges. This mysterious process sup-
posedly functions in a manner similar to Adam Smith's "unseen hand." In 
fact it does sometimes; often it does not, and stalemate or the benefiting of 
the particular interest is at least as likely to result. A member of Congress 
is understandably reluctant to concede that the desires of his constituents 
are in opposition to the interests of the nation as a whole. He is more likely 
to assert that what is good for his constituents is good for the country. Un-
doubtedly this is sometimes the case, but it would b~ naive to assume that 
it is always true. The recent outcry of "economy-minded" Congressmen 
against the decision of the administration to deactivate a number of un-
essential military installations is but one of many recent illustrations of the 
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point. Congressmen generally favor governmental parsimony, but not if it 
adversely affects conditions in their own states or districts. 
Today the Congress seems more to occupy the position of an antagonist 
than that of a co-worker with the President. This is not so much a matter 
of party affiliation as many think. Support for and opposition to the Presi-
dent in Congress overruns party lines. The fact is that the national interest 
today is represented by the President. The opposition to this development 
is in the states, and they are represented by Congress. The President has the 
force of history on his side, but he has no monopoly of institutional controls 
in his hands. Great powers are constitutionally in the hands of Congress, 
which can use them to frustrate the President. I do not argue that this ought 
never to be done, but it ought to be done intelligently and in the national 
interest, not irresponsibly and for the particular interest. 
This is probably the most difficult and persistent of all our public prob-
lems. To call for institutional reform capable of transforming Congress 
from a representative of the particular into a representative of the general 
interest is to ask the people, on occasion, to sacrifice their own interest to 
that of their fellows. And although it is not difficult to obtain a hypothetical 
consent to such a proposition, the willingness to make the actual sacrifice is 
a different matter. I can imagine the vast lack of enthusiasm, in Congress 
and the country, with which a proposal to alter the residency qualification 
for Congressional membership would be greeted. It is embarrassing even to 
mention it as part of a theoretical analysis of governmental reform. The 
British have evolved a method of producing a national consensus in their 
Parliament through the centralized control of nominations. This makes the 
legislator more responsible to the central party organization and thus to the 
nation as a whole than to the members of the constituency from which he 
is elected. It also makes possible a degree of party discipline that increases 
legislative efficiency of action. It is true that there is no residency qualifica-
tion in Great Britain as there is in the United States, but it appears to me 
that this is less consequential than the matter of central control. This change 
could be effected in the United States without a constitutional amendment, 
but the prospects for such a reform seem dim. It would be difficult to ex-
plain its advantages to a public reared in a tradition so different. And we 
may be certain that the local politicians who now play the dominant role in 
the nominating process would oppose such a change strenuously. All of the 
slogans of Jeffersonian localism, now anachronistic but effective nonethe-
less, would be hauled out, dusted off, and employed in the interest of a 
divisive particularism. All of the enormous (and largely unfounded) preju-
dice of Americans against the term "centralized control" would be exploited 
to the hilt. 
If change occurs here it will be the result either of a long and arduous 
educational program designed to convince the American people of the bene-
fits of such a reform, or of some cataclysmic experience capable of demon-
strating the inadequacies of the present system. Until then we can only hope 
to have Presidents who are effective enough to create a national consensus 
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and act upon it. We have thus far survived the handicaps imposed by a sys-
tem of direct representation, but we should recognize that such a system has 
great disadvantages. The inability of Negro citizens to enjoy their constitu-
tional rights, the difficulty of obtaining the enactment of effective tariff laws, 
the wastefulness of defense spending are all largely attributable to our fail-
ure to develop a national consensus in an institutional arrangement which 
exaggerates the importance of local interests through direct representation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
DURING THE YEARS of the cold war I have noted with interest the grow-ing scope of criticism of the functioning of our governmental system. 
This criticism has mainly followed the lines I have considered here, and it 
has emanated from a great variety of sources. There has, as yet, been no 
serious advocacy of sweeping and fundamental changes, but the area of con-
cern is so vast that it seems fair to infer that something more than superficial 
remedies are required. 
The late President Kennedy, an intellectual of high order, well under-
stood the realities of political life, especially as they involved the relations 
of the legislative and executive branches of our government. His attempts 
to weld the two into an effective consensus-producing and executing whole 
were a constant frustration to the less patient, who demanded swifter solu-
tions to national problems. Political analysts often remarked that the Presi-
dent, himself a long time member of the Congress, had a too great respect for 
the "system" ever to question the validity of its principles. I believe, how-
ever, that President Kennedy's enthusiasm for those principles was much less 
than unqualified. As an intellectual he was not only aware of the criticism, 
which had reached a high point during the few months preceding his death, 
but he was also capable of thinking realistically about the problem. That he 
had done so even before his election to the presidency is implicit in the fol-
lowing words, which comprised a part of his first major address to the Con-
gress on January 30,1960. The President said: 
Before my term has ended we shall have to test anew whether a nation 
organized and governed such as ours can endure. The outcome is by no 
means certain. 
It is remarkable that these words have received so little attention, since they 
quite clearly express some doubt concerning the viability of our system. 
Just as clearly, the President was not suggesting revolution. Nor do I. 
A truly revolutionary effort would necessarily be directed against the pur-
poses of the nation, not merely some of its organizational aspects. An attack, 
for example, upon the principles stated in the Preamble to the Constitution 
would appear to me to constitute a genuinely revolutionary effort, whereas 
proposals to establish a unicameral legislature or to abolish direct and geo-
/ graphic representation I would regard as reform measures. 
I am only proposing once more the desirability of distinguishing be-
tween means and ends. We must bear in mind that to establish our nation, 
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it was necessary to concede a degree of particularism which is no longer con-
sonant with the kind of unity that is the sine qua non of survival today. In 
the past we were better able to afford the luxury of disagreement and stale-
mate. Their consequences were inconvenience and perhaps domestic hard-
ship. But what we did then did not have the impact upon our relations with 
other nations that it does today. The lynching of a Negro fifty years ago was 
no less regrettable than it would be today, but it did not then affect our at-
tempts to entice the African nations to our side in the cold war. Unemploy-
ment has always been deprecated, but particularly so when we are trying to 
demonstrate the superiority of our own economic system to that of the Com-
munists. In the past we supported education largely because we believed its 
value was intrinsic; now we are interested as well in our ability to compete 
with our friends and enemies abroad. 
In sum, it seems to me that the public must advance in its knowledge of 
the science of government. This, I believe, would be highly desirable even 
aside from the international aspects of the problem. Government would be 
less expensive and more efficient if we were capable of viewing its structure 
in the same critical and analytical manner that we do those of, say, business 
organizations. Of course we have not done this. The aura of tradition which 
surrounds government is too great. It is unfortunate that it seems more at-
tached to the structure than to the principles of government. We have sanc-
tified the means and often lost sight of the ends. 
I do not wish to overstate the case, although I understand that many 
would argue that I have already done so. I realize that changes have been 
made, and that the means employed have altered considerably. We have 
shared, to a considerable extent, the genius of our British cousins for varying 
the substance without changing the form. With few changes in our Consti-
tution in 175 years we have made it more democratic, more representative, 
more responsible. It has been adapted from a predominantly agrarian to a 
predominantly industrial society. I admire the great process of transmuta-
tion which has occurred. This, however, does not provide irrefutable evi-
dence of future success. The burden of domestic depression, hot war, and 
cold war has been enormous. And, as I have suggested, the situation during 
the last decade or so has been especially difficult because the threat from 
without creates a social aversion to internal change. We tend to cling to the 
old - or what we are told the old was. We are less inclined to accept the 
changes necessary to achieve a national consensus, and most do not under-
stand either our failure to do so or its causes. 
President Kennedy stated that "The outcome is by no means certain." 
Surely this is the most optimistic view that can sensibly be taken. The main-
tenance of our system as we know it depends, I believe, upon the ability of 
the people to understand what is involved, for they must give their consent. 
Powerful forces stand in opposition to change. Who is going to tell the peo-
pie? Who dares tell them, knowing that to do so is to lay oneself open to the 
charge of revolution, radicalism, disloyalty, or, at best, weak-headedness. Of 
course there is nothing new in that. It is, in large part, the story of history. 
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